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Abstract—User authentication is the critical first step in detecting identity-based attacks and preventing subsequent malicious
attacks. However, the increasingly dynamic mobile environments make it harder to always apply cryptographic-based methods
for user authentication due to their infrastructural and key management overhead. Exploiting non-cryptographic based techniques
grounded on physical layer properties to perform user authentication appears promising. In this work, the use of channel state
information (CSI), which is available from off-the-shelf WiFi devices, to perform fine-grained user authentication is explored.
Particularly, a user-authentication framework that can work with both stationary and mobile users is proposed. When the user
is stationary, the proposed framework builds the user profile for user authentication which is resilient to the presence of a
spoofer. The proposed machine learning based user-authentication techniques can distinguish between two users even when
they possess similar signal fingerprints and detect the existence of the spoofer. When the user is mobile, it is proposed to
detect the presence of the spoofer by examining the temporal correlation of CSI measurements. In both office building and
apartment environments show that the proposed framework can filter out signal outliers and achieve higher authentication
accuracy compared with existing approaches using received signal strength (RSS).
Index Terms—User authentication; Channel State Information; Wireless networks.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid advancement of wireless technologies has
made wireless networks ubiquitous and thus network
services can be accessed at anytime and anywhere.
However, securing wireless networks is challenging
due to the shared nature of the wireless medium,
as adversaries can eavesdrop upon or intercept any
wireless transmission [17]. For example, an adversary
can passively monitor wireless networks to obtain
valid device identities and further launch identity-
based attacks, which serves as a basis for launching a
variety of malicious attacks across multiple network
layers [6]. Indeed, such identity-based attacks are
easy to launch in WiFi networks, where the Access
Points (APs) can be spoofed, resulting in Denial of
Service (i.e., a rogue AP attack) [33]. Although existing
cryptographic based authentication techniques (such
as WiFi Protected Access and 802.11i) can protect
data frames, an attacker can still spoof the 802.11
management frames [24]. In addition, the increas-
ingly dynamic mobile environments make it harder
to utilize cryptographic-based authentication, due to
its infrastructural and key management overhead [2],
[5], [7].
Recently authentication based on non-
cryptographic methods has been proposed to
compliment and enhance the existing cryptography
based schemes [3], [6], [10]. For example, channel
based authentication schemes use the Received Signal
Strength (RSS) of wireless packets or the Channel
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Impulse Response (CIR) of a single frequency to
generate fingerprints of the wireless channel to
perform user authentication [6], [23]. The rationale
behind these schemes is that both RSS and CIR
present unique spatial properties due to path loss
and multi-path effects. An adversary, situated at
a different location from the legitimate user, will
incur different RSS or CIR profiles. However, the
RSS and CIR extracted from a single frequency
only provide coarse-grained information about the
wireless channel and thus the effectiveness of user
authentication is largely limited. For example, the
RSS-based authentication can hardly distinguish
between two users with similar signal signatures
even though they may be located far away from each
other [6].
In this paper, we exploit the fine-grained physical
layer information made available from orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) to perform
user authentication. The channel response from mul-
tiple subcarriers of OFDM provides detailed Channel
Sate Information (CSI) [11], which could be utilized
to detect and differentiate minute changes in the
wireless channel [29]. Measuring the channel fre-
quency response thus could become an ideal candi-
date for achieving accurate user authentication lever-
aging temporal and spatial properties of the wireless
channel. Specifically, we show that CSI can be utilized
to accurately authenticate users with similar signal
fingerprints and differentiate the legitimate user from
a spoofing attacker. The detailed channel information
has the power to enable user authentication at a per
packet level, making it a promising utility to achieve
user authentication at a much higher granularity (in
both spatial and temporal domains) than existing
channel-based (i.e., RSS and CIR) approaches. Further,
CIR can only be obtained on dedicated hardware (e.g.,
USRP), which prevents it from being widely adopted
in real-world scenarios. In this work, we conduct user
authentication by associating each individual user
with his own wireless device, which is not accessible
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by other users. Each wireless device represents a
distinct user in the network. Thus user authentication
could be performed by examining the channel state
information of the associated wireless device.
CSITE [15] applies a sliding-window based tech-
nique to CSI measurements to build the user pro-
file for authentication purposes. They assume the
CSI collection is benign (without the presence of an
identity-based attacker) when building the user pro-
file. However, in practice an identity based attacker
could be present at any time. Thus, the CSI mea-
surements could be a mixture of readings from both
the legitimate user and the spoofer, leading to a mis-
classification of the user profile and falsely authen-
ticating the spoofer. To tackle such challenges raised
from real-world scenarios, we study how to construct
the user profile even when a spoofer is present and
perform robust user authentication under various ad-
versarial scenarios, e.g., when the legitimate user is
not present but the spoofer is active. In particular,
we propose a user authentication framework that can
work with both stationary and mobile users. For the
stationary scenario, the proposed framework builds
the user profile for user authentication and is resilient
to the presence of the spoofer. It involves two main
components: An Attack-resilient Profile Builder and a
Profile Matching Authenticator. The Attack-resilient Pro-
file Builder has the capability to accurately construct
the user profile of the legitimate user even when a
spoofing attacker is present. We further develop a
Profile Matching Authenticator grounded in machine-
learning based techniques to perform robust per-
packet user authentication in real-time based on CSI
measurements. In addition, we are among the first to
study the effect of different modulation and coding
scheme rates on CSI to achieve accurate user authen-
tication. For mobile scenarios, we propose to detect
the presence of a spoofer by examining the tempo-
ral correlation of CSI measurements. This involves
two main components: A Correlation Analyzer and a
Correlation-based Authenticator. The Correlation Analyzer
calculates the temporal correlation between adjacent
CSI measurements within a coherence time period,
whereas the Correlation-based Authenticator authenti-
cates the mobile user in real-time based on the tempo-
ral correlation between adjacent CSI measurements.
We summarize the main contributions of our work
as follows:
 We show that it is feasible to perform user au-
thentication by utilizing CSI from OFDM even
when the users possess similar signal finger-
prints, making fine-grained user authentication
achievable in practice.
 We develop a user authentication framework that
works with both stationary and mobile users.
To deal with a stationary user, the proposed
framework has the capability of building a user
profile under the presence of a spoofing attack
and achieves higher authentication accuracy com-
pared with existing channel based (e.g., RSS-
based) methods. For mobile users, the framework
performs real-time user authentication by lever-
aging temporal correlation of CSI measurements.
 We validate the framework by conducting real
experiments in both office and apartment envi-
ronments using off-the-shelf WiFi devices. Exper-
imental results confirm that our framework is
highly robust and effective in user authentication
under various attacking scenarios without requir-
ing any additional overhead on wireless devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we put our work in the context of re-
lated work. The attack model and our framework are
described in Section 3, and the feasibility of using
CSI to perform user authentication is presented in
Section 4. In Section 5, we detail the proposed Attack-
resilient Profile Builder based on clustering analysis.
The Profile Matching Authenticator grounded on ma-
chine learning techniques is described in Section 6.
Section 7 depicts the correlation-based user authen-
tication algorithm for mobile scenarios. We discuss
the experimental setup and methodology, and fur-
ther present the performance evaluation results of
our proposed CSI-based authentication framework in
both office and apartment environments in Section 8.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
The traditional approach to providing user authen-
tication is to use cryptographic-based authentication.
For example, Wu et al. [31] have introduced a secure
and efficient key management (SEKM) framework.
SEKM builds a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) by
applying a secret sharing scheme and an underlying
multicast server group. Wool [30] implements a key
management mechanism with periodic key refresh
and host revocation to prevent the compromise of
authentication keys. The application of cryptographic
authentication requires reliable key distribution, man-
agement, and maintenance mechanisms, which re-
duce its usability in a dynamic mobile wireless envi-
ronment (i.e., lack of a fixed key management infras-
tructure) or resource-constrained wireless networks
(i.e., limited resources on wireless devices).
Recently non-cryptographic based authentication
has drawn considerable attention [34]. In general,
non-cryptographic solutions can be categorized into
four groups: software based, hardware based, bio-
metric and physical-trait based, and channel-signature
based. Software based authentication basically re-
lies on the unique characteristics of the software
programs or protocols running on the devices [10],
[27], whereas hardware based authentication lever-
ages unique hardware traits such as channel-invariant
radiometric [3], [25] and clock skews [14], [19] to iden-
tify users. Biometric and physical-trait based authen-
tication relies on the behavioral modalities including
on-screen touch and finger movement patterns [9],
[21]. Channel-signature based authentication schemes
have been proposed to use either Received Signal
Strength (RSS) [6], [16], [32], [33], [35] or Channel Im-
pulse Response (CIR) [23], [28] to identify users. The
major advantage of using channel signatures is that it
exploits the naturally available random and location-
distinct characteristics of the wireless channel, which
is very hard to falsify, for user authentication.
For channel based user authentication using RSS,
a series of approaches [6], [32], [33] have been pro-
posed to detect identity-based attacks, determine the
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number of attackers when multiple adversaries are
masquerading as the same node identity, and localize
the adversaries. Reciprocal Channel Variation-based
Identification (RCVI) [35] exploits the reciprocity of
RSS variance to decide if all packets come from a
single or more than one sender. Ensemble [16] lever-
ages a user’s growing collection of trusted devices
that analyze variations in RSS to determine whether
the pairing devices are in physical proximity to each
other. It is important to note that although RSS is
available on current wireless devices, RSS is known
to be sensitive to multipath effects and affected by
the transmission power level. As a result, a legitimate
user may be mistakenly regarded as malicious user
due to the inherent RSS variation. Different from RSS
which is readily available in the existing wireless in-
frastructure, CIR is usually extracted from specialized
devices such as Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FP-
GAs) [28] and Universal Software Radio Peripherals
(USRPs) [23], which limit its practical utilities in real-
world scenarios.
Different from the previous work, we propose to
use Channel State Information (CSI), a readily avail-
able fine-grained channel information from the cur-
rent commercial hardware (i.e., 802.11 a/g/n devices),
which represents both amplitude and phase for each
subcarrier on the 802.11 a/g/n OFDM system. Ex-
ploiting CSI has the potential to achieve much higher
granularity (in both spatial and temporal dimensions)
for user authentication than applying existing channel
based (i.e., RSS and CIR) authentication methods. The
work most related to ours is CSITE [15], which utilizes
CSI magnitude measurements averaged over time to
generate profiles for legitimate users. [15] assumes
the CSI collected over time is benign and there is no
identity-based spoofing attack present when building
the profile. However, in practice the spoofing attack
could be present at any time. Thus, the profiles built
under such attacks cannot represent legitimate users
and may lead to false authentication of malicious
users. In our work, we develop an Attack-resilient
Profile Builder, which has the ability to detect the
presence of spoofing attacks when building profiles
for legitimate users. Furthermore, we study the effect
of different modulation and coding scheme rates on
CSI to achieve a higher accuracy of user authentica-
tion under both single antenna and multiple antenna
cases.
3 ATTACK MODEL AND SYSTEM
OVERVIEW
In this section we first introduce the attack model we
consider in this work. We then present the flow of our
proposed CSI-based user-authentication framework.
3.1 Attack Model
User authentication is a technique of confirming the
identity of a user. Based on the user authentication
result, a system can determine whether a user is
allowed to access certain restricted services, such as
restricted access of certain web sites and enterprise
data retrieval [26]. User authentication is particularly
challenging in wireless networks as it is very hard,
if not impossible, to physically confirm the truth of
a user’s identity due to the open nature of the wire-
less medium. In our user-authentication framework,
we focus on the identity-based attack, in which an
adversary can collect a legitimate user’s identity and
then masquerade as the legitimate user to pass the
user authentication process [6]. The identity-based
attack is very harmful as once having passed the user
authentication, the adversary can gain certain access
privileges and further launch a variety of malicious
attacks. For example, an adversary could easily obtain
the Media Access Control (MAC) address of a legiti-
mate WiFi device by passively monitoring the wireless
traffic and then impersonate the legitimate device by
changing its MAC address. Another example is that
by masquerading as an authorized wireless access
point (AP) or an authorized client, an attacker could
launch a variety of attacks including session hijacking,
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, or falsely advertising
services to wireless clients [33].
In this work, we assume that the identity-based
attack can be present at any time. That is, unlike
the previous work, which only considers the presence
of such an attack during the authentication phase,
we take the viewpoint that the identity-based attacks
could be present at any time in real-world scenarios
even when building profiles for legitimate users. Once
such an attack is present in the network, the adversary
spoofs the legitimate user’s device identity (e.g., a
WiFi device’s MAC address) to send out packets.
Once the attacker obtains the legitimate user’s device
identity, it can access the network with or without
the presence of the legitimate user. Furthermore, the
spoofer can be either stationary or mobile, whereas
the legitimate device is mostly placed at a fixed
position but could be moved from one location to
another (e.g., the user walks from one office room to
a meeting room). The movement of the device can be
detected using existing techniques [4], [18], [20] (e.g.,
examining the variance of the wireless signal). We
assume that the attacker does not have the capability
to capture and replay the CSI, and thus the attacker
cannot alter or jam the signals.
3.2 System Overview
We consider both stationary and mobile users. The
mobility of a user could be detected by using existing
techniques [4], [18], [20]. For stationary user, the basic
idea is to profile the user by exploiting the readily
available fine-grained CSI extracted from orthogo-
nal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) based
wireless networks, such as 802.11 a/g/n networks.
CSI reveals the wireless channel response depicting
the amplitudes and phases of every OFDM subcar-
rier. In general, CSI measurements from each user
present a unique pattern corresponding to the wireless
communication channel. Such CSI patterns can be
extracted and utilized to uniquely identify each user.
If the observed wireless packet (from a wireless device
identity) contains a different CSI pattern from the
legitimate profile, the network will raise an alert indi-
cating a possible identity-based attack and the user
authentication fails on the specific device identity.
Particularly, when both legitimate user and spoofer
are present, the proposed system should be able to
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2015 4
CSI profiles of 
each legitimate 
user
Attack-resilient 
Profile Builder
Profile Matching 
Authenticator
Clustering CSI samples 
Building user 
profile
Profile matching for 
single antenna pair
Fusion via 
multiple
antennas
Authentication  results 
No user profile 
is built
Attack is detected 
(user spoofing is 
present)
User is stationary 
or mobile?
Stationary
Calculating temporal 
correlation of adjacent 
CSI samples
Filtering non-coherence 
correlation coefficients
Correlation
Analyzer
For each legitimate user 
identity
CSI samples 
CSI samples 
with stationary
user identity u
Mobile
CSI correlation 
coefficients
Correlation based 
Authenticator
Segmenting correlation 
coefficients
Detecting coefficients 
below threshold ȟ
Fig. 1. Overview of the CSI-based user authentication
framework.
know which one is the legitimate user given its pre-
constructed CSI profiles. For mobile users, we propose
to detect the presence of a spoofer by examining
the temporal correlation of CSI measurements. The
adjacent CSI measurements from the same user within
a coherence time show strong correlation, while CSI
measurements from different users are uncorrelated
due to spatial and temporal diversities. Such a correla-
tion pattern could be utilized to determine whether an
identity-based attack exists. In mobile scenarios, we
note that when both legitimate user and spoofer are
present, the proposed system can detect the presence
of spoofer but cannot differentiate which CSI mea-
surements are from the legitimate user.
Our proposed user authentication framework, as
depicted in Figure 1, consists of four components
covering both the stationary and mobile scenar-
ios: Attack-resilient Profile Builder, Profile Matching
Authenticator, Temporal Correlation Analyzer and
Correlation-based Detector. The first two components
deal with stationary users, and the last two are for
mobile users. The network implementing this frame-
work will keep monitoring the wireless traffic and
examining CSI measurements from each packet based
on the device’s identity.
3.2.1 Components for Stationary User Authentication
Attack-Resilient Profile Builder: The novelty of our
profile builder is that it has the capability of building
the actual user profile under the presence of a spoofer.
When building the user profile for a specific user iden-
tity (ID), the presence of the spoofer will cause the CSI
measurements collected from this ID to contain the
mixture signal information from both the legitimate
user and spoofer. As a result, the profile built under
such a scenario is thus undermined by the spoofer,
leading to mistakenly authenticating the spoofer or
denying the legitimate user’s access. We assume that
the legitimate user communicates first in the network
to build its CSI profile. Even if the spoofer learns
the legitimate user’s ID quickly and comes online
right after the legitimate user communicates, there
will be two CSI clusters formed. Next, our profile
builder employing clustering analysis separates the
CSI measurements of the legitimate user from the
ones of the spoofer and determines the presence of
the spoofer. Thus, the CSI profile will not be built
in this case, and the legitimacy of the user profile
construction can thus be ensured.
Furthermore, when the legitimate user moves from
a current location to another, e.g., from an office to a
meeting room, our framework can adaptively rebuild
the user’s profile. This rebuilding procedure can be
user triggered or triggered after detecting the user
movement based on existing techniques [4], [18], [20].
Profile Matching Authenticator: This component
examines the real-time CSI measurements per packet
from a device ID and performs user authentication
by performing user profile matching. It is grounded
in machine-learning based techniques and raises an
alert if the profile matching fails. Our authenticator
aims to achieve fine-grained user authentication as it
can work at a per packet level - authenticating each
packet of the device ID. It is capable of authenticating
different users even when they possess similar signal
fingerprints due to the complex environments arising
in real systems. The authenticator works well un-
der both single antenna as well as multiple-antennas
cases.
3.2.2 Components for Mobile User Authentication
Temporal Correlation Analyzer: In this component,
we aim to analyze the correlation of the CSI mea-
surements collected from the same device ID. Partic-
ularly, the Pearson correlation coefficient is used to
indicate the correlation between any two adjacent CSI
measurements. Further, we filter out neighboring CSI
measurements that are not within a coherence time
period due to various factors (i.e., traffic collisions,
varying transmission rates, etc.).
Correlation-based Detector: Unlike stationary
users, mobile users do not have a fixed CSI profile
to match for authentication. Instead, we exam the
correlation between two adjacent CSI measurements
for user authentication. In particular, the temporal
correlation between adjacent CSI measurements of
the same user within a coherence time period should
be very high. However, the correlation should be low
(i.e., uncorrelated) if two adjacent CSI measurements
come from two different users (i.e., in the presence of
spoofing attack) due to spatial diversity of wireless
channels. Therefore, we examine the correlation
between any two adjacent CSI measurements is
within a particular segment (i.e., time window)
for user authentication. If the correlation of these
adjacent CSI measurements below a predefined
threshold, the presence of a spoofing attack is
declared. This threshold is determined empirically in
our experiments.
4 FEASIBILITY STUDY OF CSI-BASED
USER AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we first provide the background on CSI
measured from OFDM subcarriers. We then discuss
the feasibility of using CSI for user authentication.
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that is collected at three different positions.
We next present our data pre-processing techniques
applied to CSI measurements for more reliable user
authentication.
4.1 Preliminary
Our authentication framework exploits the CSI mea-
sured from OFDM subcarriers, a reliable and fine-
grained description of channel characteristics. OFDM
is widely used in wireless communication systems to
improve the communication performance by utilizing
the frequency diversity of wireless channels. For ex-
ample, OFDM is used in popular wireless networks
including IEEE 802:11a=g=n, WiMAX, 4G and Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL). OFDM is a method of encoding
data streams on multiple carrier frequencies. In par-
ticular, Data in OFDM is split into multiple streams,
which are coded and modulated respectively into
different subcarriers. The frequency of each subcarrier
is designed to be orthogonal to other subcarriers,
so that the interference during transmission is min-
imized. For example, for the OFDM employed by
the 802:11a=g=n physical layer, a relatively wideband
channel (or carrier) with 20 or 40 MHz is partitioned
into 54 or 108 subcarriers for data transmission, so that
each subcarrier can be used as a narrowband channel.
This inspires us to exploit the channel state infor-
mation extracted from OFDM subcarriers for user
authentication, which can provide a finer granularity
of the channel information and has the potential to
achieve higher accuracy for user authentication in
practice. Figure 2 depicts the amplitude of channel
state information across 30 subcarrier groups at three
different positions. For each position, the CSI of 50
packets is measured from an Intel WiFi 5300 card in
a laptop [12].
4.2 Feasibility study
To be able to use CSI for user authentication, the mea-
sured CSI from different devices should satisfy the
uniqueness requirement. That is, the CSI measured at
different devices situated at different locations should
be distinct, while the CSI collected from different
packets emitted by the same device should be similar,
if not identical. We observe in Figure 2 that the am-
plitude of CSI at different subcarriers is different due
to frequency diversity. Furthermore, the CSI shapes
from these three devices at different locations are
distinct. This is because the CSI is the reflection of
the complicated wireless channel and is affected by
the wireless environment due to reflection, refraction,
shadowing, etc. The CSI decorrelates with location
rapidly. If two users are located at different locations,
the profile of CSI should differ significantly. Addition-
ally, we observe that the CSI of multiple packets from
the same device at a fixed location exhibits the same
trend, which indicates that a unique profile could be
built for each user and can serve as the basis for user
authentication.
Note that compared to the RSS, which only pro-
vides overall received power for each packet, CSI
provides fine-grained channel information, i.e., chan-
nel responses on multiple subcarriers. Therefore, in-
stead of deploying multiple landmarks or monitors
to collect multi-dimensional RSS reading for user
authentication purposes, a single monitor can provide
multi-dimensional channel state information sufficient
for user authentication. Furthermore, since the widely
adopted IEEE 802:11n standard [1] already defines
a mechanism to exchange detailed CSI between a
pair of wireless devices, employing CSI as a unique
means for user authentication will not involve extra
communication cost for the existing WiFi networks.
Temporal Correlation: We conduct experiments to
study the temporal correlation between CSI mea-
surements. The CSI measurements are simultaneously
collected from two mobile users, u and u0, which
move at the normal speed in indoor environment. We
observe that the adjacent CSI measurements from the
same device exhibit high correlation with each other.
As shown in Figure 4 (a), generally the correlation
coefficients between two CSI measurements Cu(k)
and Cu(k0) within a coherence time (e.g., kk0   kk 
0:025sec) are close to 1. On the other hand, the CSI
measurements, Cu(k) and Cu0(k0) from two different
devices, even if the time difference kk0 kk is less than
the coherence time, have the correlation coefficients
spanning over a large range due to spatial diversity
as shown in Figure 4 (b). Based on the above observa-
tions, the temporal correlation between two adjacent
CSIs could be utilized to detect a mobile spoofer and
thereby authenticate a mobile user.
Data Preprocessing: In our study, we observe that
the mean amplitude value of CSI measurements may
shift over time. We call such a mean value shift as a
temporal bias, and it will result in inaccurate CSI profile
construction for user authentication. Therefore, our
framework develops a data preprocessing strategy to
cope with CSI samples to mitigate the effects caused
by such temporal bias.
In particular, we observe a shift in the amplitude of
a specific subcarrier due to the interference presented
at either transmitter or receiver. Figure 3 (a) plots the
curve of the CSI sample in a packet and many curves
are collected over time. It shows that the amplitude of
each subcarrier in CSI samples varies over time. Our
data preprocessing strategy adjusts the mean value
of the CSI sample (from a specific packet) to zero.
This helps to reduce the overall variance across the
subcarriers on CSI measurements before performing
user authentication. To illustrate, we denote the raw
CSI sample per packet from a particular user u as a
k-dimensional vector Cu, and the preprocessed CSI
sample can be obtained as:
Cu = Cu   11K 1
K
KX
k=1
Cu(k); (1)
where K is the number of subcarriers within a single
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CSI sample, and 11K is a K-length all-one vector.
After applying the data preprocessing strategy, the
updated CSI samples will have smaller variance and
reduced amplitude bias on each subcarrier as shown
in Figure 3(b). In addition, the wireless devices in the
802:11n network are usually equipped with multiple-
antennas. Thus, the CSI samples collected from each
channel between the transmitting antenna i and re-
ceiving antenna j of two communicating devices will
go through the pre-process as shown in Equation 1,
where Cu will be replaced by Ci;ju .
5 ATTACK-RESILIENT USER PROFILE
BUILDER
In this section, we describe the attack-resilient profile
builder which employs clustering analysis on CSI
measurements to determine whether the network en-
vironment is benign or a spoofer is present when
constructing the user profile.
5.1 Basic Idea
Since the spoofing attack could be present at any
time, we need to determine whether a spoofer is
present when constructing a user profile. Our attack-
resilient profile builder aims to ensure the legitimacy
of the user profiles even under a malicious wireless
environment. The rationale behind our attack-resilient
profile builder is that the CSI measurements of each
device present unique spatial characteristics: the CSI
has strong spatial correlation with the device’s lo-
cation. Although the wireless channel may fluctuate
over time, the CSI of wireless packets from one device
at a fixed location should be clustered together in
the multi-dimensional signal space constructed by CSI
measurements. For example, the 30 subcarriers ob-
tained in our experiments can form a 30-dimensional
CSI space, and the amplitudes of the CSI from the 50
packets in Position 1 are clustered together (i.e., has
a constant shape) in CSI space as shown in Figure 2.
Furthermore, the CSI measurements of the wireless
packets collected from another device situated at a
different location (Position 2) should form a different
CSI samples 
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Classifying CSI samples 
into 2 clusters
Attack detected 
(user spoofing is 
present)
For each 
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user identity
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Fig. 5. Work Flow for the Attack-Resilient Profile
Builder.
cluster in the CSI space. Thus, when the environment
is benign, the CSI measurements from a particular
device identity should be clustered together and form
one cluster in the CSI space, while under a spoofing
attack, the spoofer utilizes the same device identity
as the legitimate user to transmit packets, and the
CSI readings of the device identity are a mixture
of readings from both the legitimate user and the
spoofer, resulting in more than one CSI cluster.
To determine whether the network environment is
benign, our framework applies clustering analysis to
partition the CSI from one device identity into two
clusters. Under normal conditions without spoofing,
the distance between the partitioned two CSI clusters
should be small since there is basically only one
cluster from a single device at a physical location.
However, under a spoofing attack, there is more than
one device at different physical locations claiming the
same device identity. As a result, more than one CSI
cluster will be formed in the CSI space. Therefore,
the distance between two partitioned clusters will
be large as the cluster centers are derived from the
different CSI clusters associated with different loca-
tions in physical space. Therefore, by examining the
distance between the two partitioned CSI clusters, any
presence of the spoofing attack can be determined
when building user profiles. The flow of the Attack-
resilient Profile Builder is shown in Figure 5. Only
when there is no spoofing attack present, will the
profile of the legitimate user be built.
5.2 Algorithm Description
5.2.1 Modulation and Coding Scheme Study
WiFi devices usually use a fixed range of modulation
and coding scheme (MCS) for data transmission. We
find in our experiments that the modulation and
coding scheme occasionally changes to a different
one and then switches back due to the variation of
the wireless channel. And the occasionally changed
modulation and coding scheme creates outliers in the
CSI measurements. Thus, our framework first per-
forms outlier filtering based on the modulation and
coding scheme used for packet transmission before
conducting clustering analysis. In particular, MCS is
a specification of the high-throughput (HT) physical
layer (PHY) parameter in the 802:11n standard [1]. It
contains the information of the modulation order (e.g.,
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Fig. 6. CSI samples before and after filtering based on
MCS rate.
BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM), the forward error
correction (FEC) coding rate, etc. Each 802:11n packet
header (at 2.4GHz band) contains a 16-bit MCS, which
can be extracted together with the CSI sample of each
packet.
Figure 6(a) shows the raw CSI measurements for a
wireless device with two clusters formed in our exper-
iments. Under such cases, the MCS rate is changing
according to the channel conditions, and we can ob-
serve CSI samples resulting from different MCS rates.
For these cases we find the MCS values are greater
than 263, different from most of the other testing cases
in both the lab and apartment environments. We thus
filter out CSI for the packets with MCS values greater
than 263, which corresponds to a single spatial stream
with transmission rate 60Mbps [1]. After filtering out
these outliers, the CSI coming from the rest of the
packets exhibits a similar shape (i.e., forms one cluster
in the CSI space) as shown in Figure 6(b).
5.2.2 Clustering Analysis
We utilize the K-means algorithm to partition the
filtered CSI measurements from the device identity
u into two clusters. The K-means algorithm is one of
the most popular iterative descent clustering meth-
ods [13]. The squared Euclidean distance is chosen as
the dissimilarity measure. If there are S CSI samples
from the device u, the K-means clustering algorithm
partitions S CSI samples into K disjoint subsets Lk
containing Sk sample points so as to minimize the
sum-of-squares criterion:
Jmin =
KX
k=1
X
Cu;s2Lk
kCu;s   kk2; (2)
where Cu;s is a CSI vector representing the CSI value
for the sth packet and k is the geometric centroid of
the sample points for Lk in CSI space. In our cluster
analysis, we choose K = 2. We further choose the
distance between two centroids as the test statistic T
for identity-based attack detection,
Dc = jjk   k0 jj; (3)
with k; k0 2 f1; 2g.
Under normal conditions in a benign network en-
vironment, the distance between the centroids from
the K-means cluster analysis in CSI space should
be close to each other, because there is only one
cluster from a single device u at a physical location.
However, when a spoofer is present, there is more
than one device situated at different physical loca-
tions, claiming the same device identity. The distance
between two partitioned CSI clusters thus will be
large. Through the analysis above, we show that the
CSI profiles of 
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Profile matching using 
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Multiple 
antennas
Authentication
successes 
CSI samples 
with user 
identity u
Profile 
matches?
Authentication
fails 
Yes
No
Fig. 7. Work Flow for the Profile Matching Authentica-
tor.
clustering method has the capability of detecting the
presence of the spoofer by applying the threshold 
to Dc as following:
Dc >  attacker is present;
Dc   normal condition: ; (4)
5.2.3 User Profile Building
If the CSI samples are collected in a benign environ-
ment, the framework deposits the pre-processed CSI
samples, Cu, as the profile for user u for future profile
matching based authentication. We note that the user
profile only requires a small number of packets, i.e.
less than 100 packets.
If the user moves from one location to another (e.g.,
walks from his office to a meeting room), the user
authentication framework will adaptively rebuild the
user’s profile. The following are possible two ways
to update the user’s profile: 1) the user can actively
trigger the profile updating after he moves to a new
place; 2) the profile updating can be triggered by de-
tecting the user movement using existing techniques.
6 USER AUTHENTICATION LEVERAGING
PROFILE MATCHING
In this section, we present our profile matching au-
thenticator which uses machine-learning based meth-
ods for packet-level user authentication.
6.1 Basic Idea
The basic idea of our profile matching authenticator
is to use machine learning to determine whether
the CSI measurement for the incoming packet with
the user identity u matches the profile constructed
at the profile builder. If the incoming CSI sample
matches the user profile, the corresponding packet can
be authenticated successfully as being from the user
u. Otherwise, the user authentication fails. Figure 7
illustrates the work flow of our profile matching au-
thenticator. In particular, the profile matching scheme
works at the packet level, which minimizes the latency
of the authentication process. In addition, the packet-
level authentication can also be used to monitor and
count the number of packets injected by the attacker.
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6.2 Approach Description
We next present the profile matching method using
the CSI samples from a single antenna. We then
present the profile matching using CSI samples from
multiple antennas to improve the performance of user
authentication.
6.2.1 Profile Matching using a Single Antenna Pair
We perform the profile matching via the support
vector machine (SVM) technique, which is a compu-
tationally efficient way of learning good separating
hyperplanes in a high dimensional feature space. The
CSI samples are used as features in the SVM to per-
form profile matching for each user. We first study the
case using a single antenna pair for profile matching.
In this study, we consider the profile matching as
a two-class pattern classification problem. The CSI
sample Cu with user identity u denotes the data to
be classified, where u = 1;    ; U (with U the total
number of legitimate users), and let scalar y denote its
class (y 2 f 1; 1g). We use f(Cu;s; yu;s); s = 1; :::; Sg
to denote a set of CSI samples associated with the
user identity u. The challenge is how to construct a
decision function f(Cu) that correctly classifies the
input CSI data, which could be different from all the
constructed profiles.
If the constructed CSI user profiles are linearly sep-
arable, we can represent them with a linear function
in the following form:
f(Cu) = w
T
Cu + b; (5)
such that f(Cu;s)  0 for yu;s = 1 and f(Cu;s)  0 for
yu;s =  1, where w and b represent the hyperplane
f(Cu) = 0 separating two classes.
We seek such a hyperplane that maximizes the
separating margins between the two classes. In par-
ticular, this hyperplane can be found by minimizing
the following cost function:
min J(w; ) =
1
2
kwk2 +  
SX
s=1
u;s;
s:t:; yu;s(w
T
(Cu;s) + b)  1  u;s; u;s  0; s = 1;    ; S
(6)
where () is a nonlinear operator mapping the CSI
profile Cu to a higher dimensional space,   indi-
cates the significance of the constraint violations with
respect to the distance between the points and the
hyperplane and  is a slack variable vector.
The mapping between the input CSI samples
Cu;s0 and user profile Cu;s is constructed in the
form of the kernel function Kernel(; ), such as
Kernel(Cu;s; Cu;s0) = 
T (Cu;s)(Cu;s0). Particularly,
we choose a polynomial kernel as the mapping func-
tion and the problem in Equation 6 can be expressed
as
max
s
f
SX
s=1
s  
1
2
SX
s=1
lX
s0=1
u(yu;syu;s0Kernel(Cu;s; Cu;s0 ))s0g;
s:t:; s  0;
SX
s=1
syu;s = 0
(7)
where s are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
equation 7. Thus, the profile matching classifier for
input CSI sample Cu;s0 is derived as
f(Cu;s0 ) = sign(
SX
s=1
(syu;sKernel(Cu;s0 ; Cu;s) + b)): (8)
and the authentication result is determined as
f(Cu;s0 ) =

1 success
 1 failure: (9)
6.2.2 Fusion via Multiple Antennas Pairs
When multiple antennas are available, we can further
improve the performance of the user authentication
accuracy. For example, we can employ a simple ma-
jority voting process to combine the independent
profile matching results from different antenna pairs.
Assume that the input CSI samples with user identity
u between the transmitting antenna i and receiving
antenna j are represented as Ci;ju;s0 , all the independent
results from different antenna pairs consist of the
voting set 
 = ff(Ci;ju;s0); 1  i  I; 1  j  Jg, where
I and J are the numbers of transmitting and receiv-
ing antennas respectively. Finally, the authentication
result is given by
f
0
(Cu;s0 ) = sign(
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
f(C
i;j
u;s0 )): (10)
If f 0(Cu;s0) = 1, the authentication successes; other-
wise it fails.
7 CORRELATION-BASED MOBILE USER
AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we present the proposed correlation-
based method to authenticate mobile users.
7.1 Basic Idea
The basic idea to authenticate a mobile user is to
examine the temporal correlation of adjacent CSI mea-
surements from the user. The rationale behind this is
that CSI measurements for the same user within a
coherence time period should be high, whereas the
correlation is low if the CSI measurements come from
different mobile users. We next illustrate the work
flow of the proposed authentication method.
7.2 Algorithm Description
The proposed mobile user authentication algorithm
consists of two major components: a temporal corre-
lation analyzer and a correlation-based detector. The
details of each component are explained as follows:
Temporal correlation analyzer: In this component,
we first derive the correlation coefficients between any
two adjacent CSI measurements. The work flow of the
temporal correlation analyzer is shown in Figure 8.
Before calculating temporal correlation coefficients,
we smooth the CSI measurements in the frequency
domain to mitigate the impact of interference and
channel noise. Given a particular CSI measurement
Cs, which is a vector representing the channel re-
sponse of 30 carriers, the smoothing operation in
frequency domain is achieved as follows:
Cs =
1
N
min(30;f+
j
N
2
k
)X
max(0;f 
j
N
2
k
)
Cs(f); (11)
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where N is the length of the smoothing window in
the frequency domain. After smoothing, the random
channel noise over different subcarrier frequencies
would be reduced from the original CSI measurement
Cs.
Given the sequence of smoothed CSI measurements
fCsg ; 0  s  S, where s indicates the index of CSI
measurement and S is the number of CSI measure-
ments, the temporal correlation coefficient K(s+1; s)
between two adjacent CSI measurements Cs+1 and Cs
is defined as follows:
K(s+ 1; s) =
Cs+1CTs
kCs+1kkCsk
; (12)
where the superscript T denotes transpose.
Further, for regular wireless traffic, two adjacent CSI
measurements may not be within a coherence period.
The long time interval between two adjacent CSI
measurements could result in the low correlation for
a mobile user due to temporal and spatial diversity.
We thus need to filter out these CSI measurements
before performing user authentication. To facilitate
such filtering, the correlation coefficients defined in
Equation 11 is multiplied by a de-correlation factor .
Then, the updated temporal correlation coefficient is
defined as
K0(s+ 1; s) =
Cs+1CTs
kCs+1kkCsk  
 =

1; 0 < ts+1   ts  0:025 sec
Null; o:w: ;
where s indicates the index of the CSI measurement,
ts denotes the time stamp of Cs, and  is the de-
correlation factor indicating whether the correlation
coefficient should be discarded. Particularly in our
experiments, we adopt the de-correlation factor with
0:025sec as the coherence time, which is a typi-
cal value arising in multipath propagation environ-
ments [8].
If the correlation coefficients are derived from two
adjacent CSI samples spanning beyond a coherence
Authentication
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Correlation based 
Authenticator
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of K’(s+1, s) 
No
Authentication
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Fig. 9. Work Flow for the Correlation-based Detector.
period, they will be discarded; otherwise, they are for-
warded to the correlation-based detector to perform
mobile user authentication.
However, the CSI measurements may also suffer
from occasional rapid movement or strong interfer-
ence, which would destroy the correlation between
adjacent CSI measurements. In order to derive reli-
able correlation coefficients, the temporal smoothing
technique is utilized to alleviate such effects:
K(s+ 1; s) = 1
w
min(L;s+
j
w
2
k
)X
max(0;s 
j
w
2
k
)
K
0
(s+ 1; s); (13)
where w is the length of the temporal smoothing
window size.
Correlation-based Detector: As shown in Figure 9,
the correlation-based detector authenticates the mo-
bile user leveraging the temporal correlation coeffi-
cients obtained from the correlation analyzer. Given
the correlation coefficients K 0(s+ 1; s) of L CSI mea-
surements, we divide them into several segments,
where each has length Lk. For each segment, given
a threshold , if there are m correlation coefficients
K 0(s + 1; s)  , where m is derived from empirical
study, we declare the presence of attackers, otherwise
the authentication succeeds.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation
of the proposed CSI-based user authentication frame-
work in two types of real environments, laboratory
and apartment. We show that the CSI-based authen-
tication framework is resilient to attacks, and outper-
forms existing RSS-based authentication methods.
8.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct experiments in an 802.11n WiFi network
with two laptops (i.e., Lenovo T500 and T61) serving
as monitors that collect the wireless packets. These
two laptops run Ubuntu 10:04 LTS with the 2:6:36
kernel and are equipped with Intel WiFi Link 5300
wireless cards. Both Intel wireless cards’ drivers are
able to collect CSI information from each packet [1].
A commercial wireless access point, Linksys E2500, is
sending out packets that can be captured by these two
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Fig. 10. Experimental setups in (a) Laboratory and (b)
Apartment.
monitors. We use the ping command on two laptops
to simulate the authentication packets continuously
transmitted over the network. The packet rate is set
to 10 packets/second. For each packet, we extract CSI
for 30 subcarrier groups, which are evenly distributed
in the 56 subcarriers of a 20MHz channel [12]. We also
record the RSS value of each packet for comparison.
We conduct experiments in two indoor environ-
ments, i.e., a laboratory and an apartment. The labora-
tory represents the typical office environment, which
has an office cubicle and pieces of furniture that create
complex multipath effects in a large room. The apart-
ment, on the other hand, represents the typical home
environment with small rooms and simple furniture.
The size of these two environments are 11m  12m
and 11m 6m, respectively. The experimental setups
in these two environments are shown in Figure 10.
The numbered circles in the figures are the positions
used to collect CSI data for evaluating our user au-
thentication framework for the stationary case, and
the two red stars represent two network monitors.
8.2 Experimental Methodology
In the experiments, we collect 400 packets at each lo-
cation, and both CSI and RSS values of each packet are
recorded. When using RSS measurements for user au-
thentication, we employ the RSS values collected from
two network monitors as the two-dimensional feature
vector for clustering and profile matching, while our
proposed CSI-based authentication framework only
uses the CSI measurements from one network monitor
to perform user authentication.
To evaluate the performance of our proposed frame-
work dealing with a stationary user, we examine
two main attacking scenarios: 1) In the first attacking
scenario, both the legitimate user and the attacker are
present at the same time in the network. 2) In the
second attacking scenario, after the attacker obtains
the legitimate user’s identity, only the attacker is
active in the network. In order to obtain the statistical
results, we choose all possible point pairs in both
experimental environments and treat one point as the
position of the legitimate user and the other point
as the position of the attacker. We run the proposed
framework through all possible combinations of point
pairs. There are a total of 66 pairs for the laboratory
environment and 36 pairs for the apartment envi-
ronment. The experimental results are presented in
the following sections for the attack resilient profile
builder and profile matching authenticator.
For mobile user authentication, two data transmis-
sion patterns, including non-burst and burst, are stud-
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Fig. 11. Attack-resilient Profile Builder: Attack detect
ratio versus cluster distance threshold when a spoofer
is present.
ied. Particularly, non-burst data transmission means
multiple users (i.e., two users in this work) are alter-
natively transmitting with similar low data rate at the
same time, while burst data transmission means one
individual user would successively transmit massive
data packets with high data rate during a short pe-
riod. The two transmission patterns comprehensively
depict the traffic pattern in real wireless environment,
particularly, non-burst data transmission is for light
traffic (e.g., link maintenance packets transmission)
while burst data transmission is for heavy traffic
(e.g., multimedia transmission). For each transmission
pattern, we also examine two attacking scenarios: 1)
In the first attacking scenario, both the legitimate
user and the attacker are moving. 2) In the second
attacking scenario, the legitimate user is moving but
the attacker keeps stationary. In both scenarios, the
legitimate user and attacker are continuously trans-
mitting signals with the same device ID.
8.3 Metrics
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed
user authentication framework for stationary users,
we define the following two metrics: attack detection
ratio and authentication accuracy.
Attack detection ratio (during profile building):
We define the attack detection ratio R as the number
of correctly detected spoofing attacks over the total
number of experiments with spoofing attacks. The
spoofing attacks presented when building the user
profile belong to the attacking scenario 1. Given a total
number of P attacking cases the attack detection ratio
can be written as:
R =
1
P
PX
p=1
Hp
s:t: Hp =

0 Dc  
1 Dc > ;
(14)
where Dc is the distance between two centroids of
clusters formed in the profile builder, and  is the
threshold used for spoofing attack detection.
Authentication accuracy (during user authentica-
tion): We define the authentication accuracy Ap as
the number of correctly classified packets over the
total number of packets collected in the pth attacking
run. The attacks could belong to either the attacking
scenario 1 or 2. We use Nu;p to denote the number
of packets that are sent by a legitimate user u and
are correctly determined as being from the user u
by our system. Similarly, we use N 0u;p to denote the
number of packets sent by the adversary using the
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identity of the legitimate user u and are correctly
determined as not being from user u. We then define
the authentication accuracy for the pth experimen-
tal run as Ap =
Nu;p+N
0
u;p
Na;p
, where Na;p is the total
number of packets received with user identity u, and
Nu;p +N
0
u;p  Na;p.
We further define the average authentication accuracy
and worst authentication accuracy as shown below to
evaluate the general and worst-case performance.
 Average authentication accuracy: Given P tested
cases, the average authentication accuracy is
given as Aavg = 1P
PP
p=1Ap,
 Worst authentication accuracy: The worst au-
thentication accuracy chooses Ap from the attack-
ing case with the smallest number of Nu;p and
N 0u;p as Aworst = min
p
Ap.
8.4 Evaluation Results
8.4.1 Attack Detection Study During Profile Building
for Stationary User
We first compare the effectiveness of our Attack-
resilient Profile Builder when determining the pres-
ence of a spoofer (during profile building) using CSI
to that using RSS. We examine the attack detection ra-
tio by varying the threshold  . As shown in Figure 11,
the results show that the averaged detection ratio for
the proposed CSI based approach achieves 0:92 with
the optimal distance threshold 17dB in Figure 11 (a),
while the maximum detection ratio for the RSS-based
method is only 0:4 with distance threshold 2dB as
shown in Figure 11 (b). This observation indicates that
our profile builder can effectively determine whether
the network environment is benign or a spoofer is
present when building the user profiles.
8.4.2 Authentication Accuracy Study for Stationary
User
Discriminating two far-away users with similar
RSS fingerprints: Due to the irregularity of wireless
signal propagation, two geographically distant users
may share similar RSS signatures. For example, in
Figure 10 (a), the two positions 6 and 9 are about
6   7m away from each other, but their RSS fin-
gerprints obtained from our network monitor look
similar; positions 8 and 12 present the same signal
phenomenon. This makes RSS-based user authenti-
cation schemes suffer poor performance when two
legitimate users (but physically separated) present
similar signal fingerprints. In particular, we observe
that the authentication accuracy for the RSS-based
method degrades to only around 0:64 as shown in
Figure 12. However, our proposed CSI-based method
could still achieve the authentication accuracy close
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Fig. 13. User authentication accuracy comparison
between CSI-based and RSS-based methods.
to 1. These results confirm that CSI measurements
provide fine-grained information on differentiating
users, even when their RSS measurements are similar.
Comparison with RSS-based method: We next
study the overall performance of our CSI based user
authentication method. Figure 13 shows the com-
parison of the authentication accuracy when using
CSI-based and RSS-based methods in the two dif-
ferent environments (i.e., a laboratory and an apart-
ment). We note that the RSS-based method relies
on RSS values collected from two network monitors
to perform user authentication, while our proposed
CSI-based authentication framework only uses the
CSI measurement from one antenna at one network
monitor. We observe that our proposed CSI-based
method outperforms the RSS-based method in both
experimental environments. Specifically, Figure 13 (a)
shows that the average authentication accuracy for
CSI-based method is very high (above 0:984), and
the RSS-based method has a lower authentication
accuracy (i.e., 0:92). Furthermore, we show that the
worst authentication accuracy for RSS-based method
reduces to around 0:27 and 0:36 in the apartment and
laboratory environments respectively, whereas our
CSI-based method maintains the high authentication
accuracy over 0:95 as presented in Figure 13 (b). These
observations strongly indicate the robustness of our
CSI-based user authentication framework even when
only a single antenna is used on WiFi devices.
Impact of single/multiple antennas: We further
examine the performance when employing measure-
ments from multiple antennas. We expect that using
measurements from multiple antennas can provide
better reliability for user authentication. Figure 14
shows that both the average and worst authentica-
tion accuracy exhibit an increasing trend when more
antennas are used. In particular, the authentication
accuracy of using a single antenna in the apartment
and laboratory environments is over 0:95. When the
number of antenna pairs (i.e., a set of transmitting and
receiving antennas) increases from 1 to 4, the average
authentication accuracy in laboratory and apartment
further improves, and the worst authentication accu-
racy improves even more. We also observe that when
using three antenna pairs in the laboratory environ-
ment the authentication accuracy has a slightly drop
when comparing to that of using two antenna pairs.
This is because although current commodity wireless
devices are usually equipped with multiple antennas,
the main antennas usually have better quality of
signal reception. Therefore, including the CSI samples
from the main antennas (i.e., using one or two antenna
pairs in our experiments) results in better stability of
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involving single and multiple antennas.
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Fig. 15. Impact of user profile size on CSI-based user
authentication accuracy.
user authentication.
Impact of user profile size: Finally, we study how
the number of packets (i.e., user profile size) em-
ployed to build the user profile affects the perfor-
mance of our framework. We vary the size of user
profile from 1 sample to 200 packets, and the corre-
sponding average authentication accuracy is shown in
Figure 15. When the size of the user profile increases,
the authentication accuracy increases and then main-
tains a high level (i.e., over 0:95). We note that even if
the profile of each user contains only one CSI sample,
the authentication accuracy is still over 0:91. These
results demonstrate that our profile builder is highly
effective in our proposed framework.
8.4.3 Authentication Performance for a Mobile User
To evaluate the authentication performance for a mo-
bile user, we study both non-burst and burst data
transmission patterns. Note that the data rate for
non-burst data transmission is 10 pkt/sec, while burst
data transmission is 100 pkt/sec. Given the fixed data
transmission rate, the authentication accuracy main-
tains when varying the de-correlation factor thresh-
old. Each round of authentication process takes about
three seconds. For each data transmission pattern, we
also examine two attacking scenarios as introduced
in 8.1.
Non-burst Data Transmission Study: First we
study the authentication performance under non-
burst data transmission. In order to evaluate the
authentication performance under the impact of dif-
ferent parameters, we vary the correlation coefficient
threshold from  0:1 to 1. Further, we evaluation the
performance by varying the parameter m from 1 to
20. Note that we require m correlation coefficients of
adjacent CSI measurements to exceed the threshold
for user authentication. The total number of packets
used for each round of user authentication is about
30. The authentication accuracy for Scenario 1 and 2
are shown in Figure 16 (a) and (b) respectively, where
V (m; ) indicates the authentication accuracy curve
under the requirement of at least m correlation coeffi-
cients of adjacent CSI measurements beyond different
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Fig. 16. Mobile user authentication accuracy for non-
burst transmission.
correlation coefficient thresholds. For both scenarios,
as the correlation coefficient threshold increases, the
authentication accuracy increases first and then de-
creases. Particularly, givenm = 20, The authentication
accuracy first goes up to as high as 99:7% with the
threshold at around 0:4, and then decreases to around
68:1% as the threshold reaches 1 in Scenario 1. A
similar trend is also observed in Scenario 2 (i.e.,
given m = 20, the authentication accuracy reaches
a maximum of 99:6% at the threshold  = 0:3, and
then falls to 69:5% as the threshold increases to 1.).
Further, we also observe that the proposed approach
achieves high authentication accuracy (i.e., over 99%)
under any values of m ranging from 1 to 20.
In addition, to provide more comprehensive au-
thentication performance of the proposed approach,
we also summarize the detection ratio and false pos-
itive ratio in Table 1 with m = 20. For both scenarios,
given appropriate threshold values, the detection ratio
would approach 100% while the false positive ratio is
close to 0%. The above results confirm that the pro-
posed framework is highly effective in authenticating
mobile users with non-burst data transmission.
Burst Transmission Study: Next we examine the
authentication performance for burst data transmis-
sion. The authentication accuracy for burst data trans-
mission also follows the same trend as non-burst
data transmission as the threshold value increases.
Different from non-burst data transmission, burst data
transmission involves many long CSI sequences from
a single user, which leads to high correlation coef-
ficients over a long period. So, the number of low
correlation coefficients is fewer than that in non-burst
data transmission. Therefore the thresholds to achieve
maximum authentication accuracy should be higher.
Consequently, a higher threshold would also falsely
determine some low correlation coefficients from a
single user as attacking cases. As shown in Figure 17
(a) and (b), given m = 20, the maximum authentica-
tion accuracy is 93:25% and 90% for Scenario 1 and
2 respectively when the threshold is 0:8. Therefore,
the overall mobile user authentication performance
under burst data transmission is slightly worse than
Threshold Scenario 1 Scenario 2
DR FPR DR FPR
0.1 98.3% 0 97.4% 0%
0.2 99.3% 0 98.8% 0%
0.3 100% 0.1% 99.5% 0%
TABLE 1
Authentication performance for non-burst data
transmission.
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Fig. 17. Mobile user authentication accuracy for burst
transmission.
that of non-burst data transmission. The detection
ratio and false positive ratio for burst transmission
are presented in Table 2, which exhibits good au-
thentication performance for both attacking scenarios.
Particularly, as the threshold increase from 0.6 to 0.8,
the detection ratio increases from 79:5% and 70:6%
to 93:6% and 92:2% for Scenario 1 and 2 respectively,
while the false positive ratio increases from increases
from 0% and 7:2% to 0% and 13:4% for Scenario 1 and
2 respectively.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed to utilize channel
state information (CSI) to perform practical user au-
thentication in wireless networks. The fine-grained
channel information revealed in CSI has the potential
to perform accurate user authentication. We have
proposed a CSI-based user authentication framework
that can work with both stationary and mobile users.
Particularly, stationary user authentication includes
an Attack-resilient User Profile Builder and Profile
Matching Authenticator. The Attack-resilient Profile
Builder employs clustering analysis to intelligently
determine whether the network environment is be-
nign without the presence of the identity-based attack
when constructing the profile for the legitimate user.
The Profile Matching Authenticator performs packet
level user authentication grounded on Support Vector
Machine (SVM) techniques. It has the capability to dis-
tinguish between two users even when they possess
similar signal fingerprints. Mobile user authentication
leverages the temporal correlation of wireless channel
and includes a Temporal Correlation Analyzer and
Correlation-based Detector. The Temporal Correlation
Analyzer derives the temporal correlation coefficients
between consecutive CSI measurements after filtering,
whereas the Correlation-based Detector performs au-
thentication based on the empirical threshold. Our
extensive experiments conducted in both lab and
apartment environments confirm the feasibility of ex-
ploiting CSI to perform accurate user authentication.
The evaluation results show that the proposed CSI-
based approach is highly effective for both stationary
and mobile users.
Threshold Scenario 1 Scenario 2
DR FPR DR FPR
0.6 79.5% 0 70.6% 0%
0.7 88.3% 0 80.5% 3.6%
0.8 93.6% 7.2% 92.2% 13.4%
TABLE 2
Authentication performance for burst data
transmission.
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